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INTRODUCTION 
Let me begin by making a few candid remarks. I am both honoured and somewhat 
nervous to present this paper. I am honoured in that some of my more recent work 1 has 
generated sufficient interest that the organizers of this conference thought it appropriate for 
me to address the issue of inclusion. I am nervous because the topics that are to be dealt 
with are some of the most difficult that Canada as a society and we, as members of the 
legal community, need to confront. Specifically, I am apprehensive because issues of 
racialized diversity are frequently highly charged and emotional and can often deteriorate 
into debates that are premised upon misunderstandings and defensiveness. Moreover, I 
am concerned that my thoughts may be misinterpreted. As a white male university 
professor with tenure I hardly qualify as an "outsider", as one who is excluded. Thus I 
should not be misunderstood as speaking on behalf of those who are at the margins of 
Canadian society. Indeed my focus is not so much on the experiences of those who have 
been historically excluded, but rather on the options that are available to those of us who 
are "insiders". Furthermore, I am not a judge and have little or no familiarity with what Lord 
Justice Brooke described as "the culture of judging".2 However, as a member of the 
university community I have some experience in judging (in terms of admissions, 
examinations etc.) and issues of cultural diversity have generated a lot of debate in the 
universities for quite a while.3 
1 R. Devlin, "We Can't Go On Together with Suspicious Minds: Judicial Bias and Racialized Perspective in 
R. v. R.D.S." (1995) 18 Dal. L.J. 408. 
2 Mr. Justice Henry Brooke, "The Administration of Justice in Multicultural Societies" unpublished 
manuscript, May 21st, 1996, (on file with author). 
3 See e.g. R. Devlin and A.W. MacKay, "An Essay on Institutional Responsibility: The Indigenous Blacks 
and Micmac Programme at Dalhousie Law School" (1991) 14 Dal. L.J. 295; R. Devlin, ''Towards Another Legal 
Education: Some Tentative and Speculative Proposals" (1989) 38 U.N.B.L.J. 89; C. Aylward, "Adding Colour-
A Critique of: An Essay on Institutional Responsibility: The Indigenous Blacks and Micmac Programme at 
Dalhousie Law School" (1995) 8 C.J.W.L. 470. 
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However, despite my reservations, I plan to forge ahead and to address my topic: 
"Judging and Diversity", which I have unimaginatively subtitled "Justice or Just Us?". 
It is clear that the inevitable is upon us: as a society Canada is undergoing 
significant social change and law, as a social institution and mod_e of social interaction and 
regulation, cannot be immune to such changes. I want to suggest to you that these 
transitions are more than statistical - they are cultural and in that sense they will generate 
significant changes, indeed challenges, to our conventional ways of doing things. Change 
is of course somewhat unnerving, even disturbing or threatening, but I want to ask what 
sort of responses are available to us as we attempt to continue our commitment to the 
promotion of justice in Canadian society. Can we begin to imagine judicial perspectives 
and techniques that are forward looking and sensitive to cultural diversity - a pluralistic 
justice - or should we stick with a conception of justice that reflects the perspectives of 
those of us who have traditionally occupied positions of legal responsibility and power-that 
is, justice as just us?4 
In a few moments I will outline three different approaches to judging in a pluralist 
society which may serve as potential points of reference for discussions on the topic of 
"the court in an inclusive society". But before doing so I want to address an issue that is 
often foremost in the minds of some judges as they approach judicial education 
programmes: the threat that they might pose to judicial independence and impartiality. 
4 See also D. Fraser, "The First Cut is (Not) The Deepest: Deconstructing 'Female Genital Mutilation' and 
the Criminalization of the Other" (1995) 18 Dal.L.J. 310. 
-5-
II DIVERSITY, INDEPENDENCE AND IMPARTIALITY. 
As I mentioned in my introductory comments, profound cultural transitions inevitably 
generate challenges to our conventional ways of doing things. And change and challenge 
are destabilizing. It is therefore quite understandable that one response might be to fear 
that such changes could constitute an affront to the two fundamental principles of judicial 
office: independence and impartiality. Consequently, I think that it is appropriate to briefly 
consider the significance and purpose of these two principles. 
Specifically, it might be helpful to focus on the relationship between independence 
and impartiality. While both principles in the abstract are frequently invoked, my 
experience has been that there tends to be an overemphasis on the former 
(independence) at the expense of the latter (impartiality). For example, in the last year 
there have been two quite important books published addressing the status of the judiciary 
in Canada: Judicial Conduct and Accountability' and A Place Apart: Judicial Independence 
and Accountability in Canada.6 While both works are very helpful, to my mind one of their 
most serious limitations is that they take as their major premise the principle of judicial 
independence. In other words, both books tend to consider judicial independence to be an 
5 Hon. Mr. Justice David Marshall, Judicial Conduct and Accountability (Toronto: Carswell, 1995). 
6 M. Friedland, A Place Apart: Judicial Independence and Accountability in Canada (Ottawa: Canadian 
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end in itself and this, in turn, renders all other principles such as impartiality and 
accountability second order. 7 
Communication Group, 1995). 
7 For a further discussion of both books, see R. Devlin, Book Review (1996) 75 Can. Bar Rev. 398. 
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While the importance of judicial independence cannot be gainsaid, I think that there 
is a danger in treating it as an end in itself. It seems to me that the primary goal that we 
should be aiming for is ethical, fair and responsible decisionmaking. In other words, I 
would suggest that impartiality is the end to be achieved and that independence is a means 
- a crucial means -to that end, but not an end in itself. Nor am I alone in making this 
suggestion. A similar point was made, if only in passing, by the Supreme Court in R v. 
Lippe.8 I would argue that this reallocation of emphasis from independence to impartiality 
is important because it puts independence in context. It means that we cannot rely on 
judicial independence as some sort of conversation stopper. Rather, it is reconceived as a 
vital mechanism in our quest for fairness in decision-making. But it is only one of several 
vital components. Others might include competence, accountability and equality. 
Once we reconfigure the equation to realize that independence is a variable and not 
a solution per se, we are in a position to more adequately pursue our primary goal of 
fairness in decisionmaking. Thus I would suggest that programmes which are designed to 
provide information about the challenges of cultural diversity to the judiciary should not be 
perceived as threats to judicial independence but rather as aids to the achievement of 
better informed decision-making. To the extent that they help us to understand how 
systemic inequality can insinuate itself into our everyday practices, such programmes serve 
as a necessary, if insufficient, prerequisite to the goal of impartiality. 
8 [1991] 2 S.C.R. 114 at 139. 
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Ill THREE CONCEPTIONS OF IMPARTIALITY IN A PLURALISTIC SOCIETY 
Having briefly addressed the issue of the relative importance of independence and 
impartiality, I now want to proceed to the heart of my presentation: an overview-of three 
potential conceptions of impartiality in a pluralistic society. 
Traditionally, we have tended to have a rather simplistic conception of impartiality: 
do nothing to indicate any favouritism or hostility to any of the parties in a court action. In 
reality, as many judges have candidly informed me, the picture is much more complicated. 
This is particularly the case when one encounters diversity in the courtroom. Furthermore, 
while judges have been struggling with issues of impartiality in the trenches, the issue of 
impartiality has been simultaneously the focus of extensive academic analysis over the last 
decade.9 This indicates that impartiality is what philosophers describe as "an essentially 
contested concept"10: its meaning is "up for grabs". 
Over the last year, I have spent a lot of time thinking about how we might address 
pluralism and impartiality. For the purpose of discussion I want to present you with three 
models of impartiality that might either reflect some of your own thoughts on the matter, or, 
9 See e.g. B. Barry, Justice as Impartiality (New York: Clarendon Press, 1995). 
10 E. Gallie, "Essentially Contested Concepts" (1956) 77 Proceedings of the Aristotelian Soc. 167. 
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which you might wish to consider. These can be described as the classical, relational and 
situational conceptions of impartiality. To be clear, these models are heuristic devices: I 
am not claiming that anyone subscribes to any of these in a pure form or that they are 
mutually exclusive, but I do want to suggest that they may reflect different images of justice 
and impartiality. Moreover, to try to dramatize the differences I have attached an iconic 
representation of justice from the world of art to each of these models, in part because I 
believe that seeing and hearing are two quite distinct ways of thinking about a problem. 
However, I am no art critic. What is offered is simply my interpretation of these pieces for 
the purposes of this discussion. 
A CLASSICAL 
This is perhaps the most 
conception of impartiality. The 
blindfolded. It is such a popular 
did not have to go very far to 
the brochures of the library at 
am currently a visiting 
BIBLIOTHEQUE 
DE 
DROIT 
"AUDI ALTERAM PARTEM" 
�McGill 
CONCEPTION 
familiar and comfortable 
icon is, of course, Themis 
understanding of impartiality that I 
find a representation: it adorns 
the Faculty of Law at McGill where 
professor. 
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The idea is very straightforward: a judge is to divest himself/herself of all 
preconceptions and identifications. The role of a judge is simply to discover and apply the 
law. The classical conception is premised upon what one of Canada's leading 
philosophers, Charles Taylor, calls "the ideal of disengagement".11 Reason, not emotion, 
will ensure fairness. Equality before the law is the mantra: thus everyone is to be treated 
the same regardless of their race, class or gender. 
Specifically, when it comes to issues of race the classical ideal is that the judge 
should be colourblind.12 The assumption is that each person is an individual and that racial 
identity (in the sense of skin colour) is presumptively irrelevant unless its particular 
relevance can be causally demonstrated in a particular case. 13 In short, objectivity is 
attained through withdrawal and disinterestedness. 14 
11 C. Taylor, Philosophy and The Human Sciences: Philosophical Papers, Volume II 5 (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1985). 
12 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 at 559 (1896), Harlan J., dissenting; over'd by Brown v. Board of 
Education, 347 U.S. 483 at 494 (1954). 
13 Mccleskey v. Kemp 481 U.S. 279 (1987). 
14 M. Hoeflich & J. Deutrch, "Judicial Legitimacy and the Disinterested Judge" (1978) 6 Hofstra L. Rev. 769. 
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The classical approach has a long and distinguished pedigree. Icons of justice 
blindfolded go back at least as far as the middle ages. 15 Further, John Rawls, perhaps the 
greatest liberal thinker of the twentieth century, constructs his arguments on the basis that 
decisions about justice are best made behind a "veil of ignorance". 16 
But it has a couple of limitations. 
15 R. Jacob, Images de la Justice (Paris: Le Leopard d'Or, 1994). 
16 J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, Mass: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1971 ). 
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First and most importantly, "the ideal of disengagement" is at odds with the 
inescapable reality that we are social beings, that we are inevitably saturated with 
relationships and preconceptions. Thus disengagement can only be bought at a price: 
usually at the risk of objectifying those with whom we have to deal. The problem with 
justice blindfolded is that it tends to conflate impartiality with the impersonal, a move that 
can result in a judge's humanity being subordinated to some bureaucratic role.17 As the 
Canadian Judicial Council states in its Commentaries on Judicial Conduct: 
Impartiality is one thing, indifference is another. A judge may show alertness to the 
problems of our days without putting his impartiality into jeopardy.18 
Second, the conventionalism of the classical approach renders it of dubious utility in 
a society such as Canada which is undergoing fundamental cultural change. There is an 
in-built-tendency within the classical model to believe that fair decision-making can only be 
achieved if there is solipsistic harmony with traditional ways of doing things. To the extent 
17 See more generally, V. Havel, "Politics and Conscience" in J. Vladislav ed., Vaclav Havel or Living in 
Truth 136 (Boston: Faber and Faber, 1989). 
18 Canadian Judicial Council, Commentaries on Judicial Conduct 46 (Cowansville, Yvon Blair, 1991 ). 
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that the classical model accepts the myth of colourless individualism, it runs the risk of 
mistaking colourblindness for cultural neutrality. 19 
B RELATIONALIST CONCEPTION 
A relationalist approach to impartiality goes to the other end of the spectrum. 
Whereas the classical approach advocates that the judge be as disengaged as possible 
from the parties• before them, a relational approach suggests that a judge should 
incorporate a large degree of empathy into his or her tasks. 
The relationalist approach puts a premium on contextualism. That is, relationalism 
recognizes that we all have inescapable social contexts that influence our life experiences, 
our conduct and our understandings of the world. Consequently, relationalists argue that 
we cannot ignore such social variables and that we should strive to be as fully conscious 
of these as possible so as to offset any taken for granted assumptions. 
In the context of diversity, a relationalist approach would suggest that a judge should 
confront and come to terms with "racialization" (as opposed to racial identity or skin colour) 
that is, unequal and hierarchal social relations constructed on the basis of race. 
Consequently before judging, one should attempt to see the world from the perspective of 
the "other". 
19 For a further discussion of these problems, see Devlin, supra note 1. 
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The iconic representation of justice which one advocate of relationalism20 has 
chosen is a piece of African art entitled "The Lord of Jurisprudence". 
20 J. Resnick, "On the Bias: Feminist Reconsiderations of the Aspirations for Our Judges" (1988) 61 So. 
Cal. L. Rev. 1877. 
Nail Figure, 1875/1900, Kongo. Photograph© 1996 The Detroit Institute of Arts, Founders 
Society Purchase, Eleanor Clay Ford Fund for African Art. 
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Nail Figure, 1875/1900, Kongo. Photograph© 1996 The Detroit Institute of Arts, Founders 
Society Purchase, Eleanor Clay Ford Fund for African Art. 
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At least two things are worth noting about this image: firstly, the judge here is not 
blindfolded, but rather the eyes are fully open to the events of the world; and secondly, this 
Lord of Jurisprudence is pierced with knives, which can be interpreted as the pain of 
attempting to internalize the perspectives and experiences of the other in the process of 
judging. 
This relational approach is of much more recent vintage than the classical approach, 
but is strongly favoured by several high profile American law professors21 and Professor 
Nedelsky at University of Toronto.22 It has been given its most articulate philosophical 
articulation by Charles Taylor of McGill in an important essay entitled "Understanding and 
Ethnocentricity" when he calls for "a fusion of horizons".23 Traces of it are also to be found 
in the work of Madame Justice Bertha Wilson when she argued, in a powerful metaphor, 
that a judge must 
21 See, for example, M. Minow, Making all The Difference: Inclusion, Exclusion and American Law (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1990); Resnick, supra note 20; K. Karst, "Judging and Belonging" (1988) 61 So. Cal. 
L. Rev. 1957. 
22 J. Nedelsky, "The Problem of Judgment" (forthcoming Queen's Quarterly}. 
23 Taylor, supra note 11. 
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try to enter the skin of a litigant and to make his or her experience part of your 
experience, and only when you have done that, to judge.24 
24 "Will Women Judges Really Make A Difference?" (1990) 28 Osgoode Hall L.J. 507 at 521. 
- 1 9 -
While intuitively attractive, I think that there are a couple of significant problems with 
this approach. First, I am a bit of a skeptic and I doubt our capacity as human beings to be 
able to adequately come to terms with the position of the other.25 Secondly, I worry about 
the danger of appropriation. In the effort to empathize with the marginalized, those who 
have privilege may begin to speak on behalf of the excluded, usually mistranslating their 
experience and thereby reinforcing their silence. Thirdly, I wonder whether the burden of 
relationalism is too great, whether we are actually capable of taking on the context and 
pain of the other and still be able to do the job of judging. 
Thus I want to suggest to you a third conception that lies somewhere in between the 
classical and relational models, although it draws heavily on relationalism's commitment to 
contextual ism. 
C SITUATIONAL CONCEPTION 
In this model I want go immediately to the iconic representation and then try to tease 
out its key insights. It is, rather obviously, a complicated piece which warrants a telling of 
the story of its background. 
25 For a further critique of Minow's work in this regard, see my "Demanding Difference (But Doubting 
Discourse)" (1994) 7 C.J.W.L. 156. 
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Jurisprudence, 1 903, Gustav Klimt. Photograph© 1 996 Verlag Galerie Welz. 
The painter is Gustav Klimt, more famous for his piece "The Kiss" with which I am 
sure you are all familiar. This work is called "Jurisprudence". The painting was 
commissioned by the University of Vienna in 1 897 as part of a series representing the 
various faculties: law, medicine, and philosophy. For our purposes it might be noted that 
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the university stipulated that the governing theme should be the "triumph of light over 
darkness". It was a large pa inting, measuring approximately three metres by four metres. 
It took Klimt several years to finish the series and when he did the university administration 
was not pleased because it did not comply with their vision. To their minds it was ugly, 
even hellish. There ensued an enormous controversy, but in the end Klimt agreed to buy 
back the works in 1907. Unfortunately, this piece was destroyed during the second world 
war. All that rema ins are some black and white reproductions, rather than the vivid gold 
and black of the original .  (Hence the d ifficulty of obtaining a clear reproduction). 
There are several points about this piece that provide us with an insight into what I 
ca l l a situationalist approach to impartial ity. Despite the fact that Klimt might be open to 
criticism as to his portrayal of women in this and other works, there are several aspects of 
the work that might be relevant to our inquiry: 
First, unl ike the first two representations, Justice (the figure at the top of the 
pa inting, in the middle) is not freestanding or isolated. She is very clearly part of the 
broader socia l context, although somewhat detached. 
Second, Justice is not blindfolded, but apparently aware of this larger social context. 
Third, Justice is flanked by law on the right and passion/emotion on the left; both 
therefore appear to have a role to play. 
Fourth, as we move to the bottom of the page, Klimt gives us a very stark 
representation of the person who comes before the law: naked, emaciated and haunched. 
Law, while having aspirations for justice, can also have a very negative impact. 
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Fifth, between justice at the top and the defendant/litigant at the bottom there are 
three female figures who I interpret to be the three goddesses of fate. According to Greek 
mythology Zeus and Themis are the parents of the Fates -those who determin� a person's 
life. One (Clotho - spinner) represents birth; another (Lachesis -apportioner) measures out 
the thread of life; and the third (Atopos - inflexible) cuts the thread, thereby signifying 
death. 
Sixth, there is the multicoloured octopus type figure whose tentacles appear to be 
enveloping the "antihero". This I interpret as the representation of social forces that 
embrace us as we struggle through our experiences. 
Seventh, and finally, there are several faces who appear to be caught between 
Justice at the top of the painting and the Fates and societal forces represented at the 
bottom of the painting: these might be judges who are caught between the ideal of justice 
and the messiness of social reality. 
What, you might ask, does this have to do with impartiality, diversity and inclusion? 
The act of judging, within this situationalist conception, is an inescapably social act. 
Situational ism emphasizes that everyone who is involved in the legal process - both those 
who judge and those who are judged - are deeply affected by their experiential contexts. 
Specifically, it suggests that cultural forces are always crucial variables and that judging 
can only aspire to impartiality if it is sensitive to social phenomena such as racialization. 
And racialization affects us all. To my way of thinking we are all racialized, but we are 
racialized differently. Racialization is (among other things) a process of social encoding; it 
is a pattern of attributing presumptive attitudes, attributes or practices to certain people 
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because they are from a particular cultural background. Generally speaking, white people 
are racialized with relatively positive presumptions while people of colour are racialized with 
relatively negative presumptions. 26 Situationalism encourages us to remember that we are 
all racialized, but that racialization has a d ifferential impact depending upon our cultural 
background. 
Moreover, situational ism has quite a d istinct conception of equality from that which 
underpins the classical model. Whereas the classical model favours sameness of 
treatment, situationalism (because of its keen awareness of the d ifferential impacts of 
racialization) can contemplate the possibility of differential treatment being a mechanism of 
equality. In short, a situational approach to impartiality implies the need to be able to 
"d iscriminate sensitively".27 As the Supreme Court suggested in Turpin, equality is to be 
interpreted so as to remedy or prevent "discrimination against groups suffering social, 
political and legal d isadvantage in society".28 
As these comments might still seem a little too abstract, let me try to be a little more 
specific by suggesting some questions that might emanate from a situationalist approach. 
26 See more genera l l y, Commission on Systemic Racism in the Ontario Criminal Justice System, Report of 
the Commission on Systemic Racism in the Ontario Criminal Justice System (Toronto: Queen's Printer, 
1995). 
27 Taylor, supra note 11 at  8. 
28 R. v. Turpin [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1296 at 1333. 
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But, again, to be clear these questions do not generate substantive right answers; rather 
they are more procedural. 
The first question I might suggest is not "How am I to judge?" but rather "How am I 
to judge an/other?". The distinction is important, because the first formulation suggests an 
essentially static role whereas the latter reminds us that judging is a dynamic process that 
is an art as much as bureaucratic function. More importantly still, the latter formulation 
. suggests that before we judge we attempt to make a good faith, if self-consciously modest, 
effort to come to terms with another's beliefs or conduct as they understand them. This 
quest for an "enlarged mentality"29 does not mean that we have to accept that 
understanding as legally legitimate, but it does mean that we have to at least temporarily 
suspend and relativize our own understandings and avoid overhasty conclusions. It entails 
respect for other world views, not an abdication of autonomous judgement.30 
The second question is to always ask: "Would I reach a different decision if the 
parties in question were white or people of colour?" I emphasize that this should happen in 
all cases, and not just in cases involving people of colour, for two reasons. First, by asking 
it in all cases it helps us to remember that white people are also racialized (usually in a 
privileged manner) and it encourages us to reflect whether we are actively privileging the 
white person because of some unarticulated assumptions, a privileging that would not 
occur if we were dealing with a person of colour. Second, to ask this question only in 
circumstances involving people of colour runs the danger of leaving unquestioned our 
29 Nedelsky, supra note 22 (drawing on Arendt) 
30 Ibid. 
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traditional legal standards which might themselves be premised upon some culturally 
contingent assumptions that need rethinking. Avoiding such questioning may be forcing 
people of colour into compliance with certain notions that may be worthy of reconsideration 
and reform. 
The third question might go as follows: "If I were the person appearing before the . 
judge, do I think that sufficient reasons have been given to satisfy me that I have been 
treated in a fair manner, even if I have not won my point?" In my review of several recent 
cases involving allegations of apprehended judicial bias,31 there have been some dicta 
from appeal courts suggesting that the less judges say the better, as they will then be less 
likely to open up themselves to allegations of an apprehension of bias. My own view is that 
this emerging trend is unfortunate and contradicts the ethical requirement of judicial 
openness and candour. Problems of diversity cannot be avoided by rendering them 
invisible. Rather, it is desirable to explicitly address them with integrity and candour. As 
Mr. Justice Freeman of the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal has recently stated: 
Questions with racial overtones make the difficulties [of assessing credibility 
(and judging more generally? R.F.D.)] more intense, yet these questions 
must be addressed freely and frankly and to the best of the judge's ability. 
Because of their explosive nature they are more likely than any others to 
subject the judge to controversy and allegations of bias, but they cannot be 
ignored if justice is to be done. 32 
To be clear, these three questions do not predetermine substantive conclusions. 
They certainly do not mean that people of colour are being subjected to less rigorous legal 
standards. Rather, they can be understood as regulative mechanisms through which we 
can monitor some of our own taken for granted assumptions. Moreover, a situationalist 
31 Devlin, supra note 1. 
32 R. v. R.D.S. (1995), 145 N.S.R. (2d) 284 at 295. 
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approach is not a panacea. It does not mean that we will always be beyond reproach, but 
if we are mistaken then others can demonstrate to us our weaknesses and we can learn 
from our mistakes. In short, the development of a pluralistically sensitive conception of 
impartiality cannot come prepackaged: it can only be achieved by trial and error. 
This ethic of openness, modesty and self-reflexivity conveniently leads me to my 
concluding points. 
IV LOWERING OUR SIGHTS: MINIMIZING PARTIALITY 
Above I suggested that while independence was obviously desirable, it should be 
understood as a means to the end of impartial and fair decisionmaking. Further, I have 
indicated that in my opinion this latter goal can probably be best pursued if we adopt a 
situationalist approach to impartiality. But even in this regard I want to urge caution. 
Impartiality and objectivity are ideals, and while ideals can be important motivations to 
action, they can also be distractions. One of the things that a situationalist approach 
highlights is that because of the messiness of our diverse contexts we are highly unlikely 
ever to get a full understanding of what is going on. This, in turn, suggests that true 
impartiality, objectivity or neutrality are unknowable and unattainable.33 Thus, I wonder if it 
would not be more fruitful for us to change our focus: instead of forever seeking something 
that we cannot even know, never mind achieve, should we not deal with that of which we 
are sure - that we are inevitably partial? If we adopt this approach our task becomes 
33 It is on this point that the situationalist approach differs most markedly from the relationalist approach for 
the latter aspires to rework and reconstruct impartiality and is therefore "idealist". 
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somewhat different and more immediate: to try to minimize the risks of our being 
uninformed, biased or partial. This does not guarantee objectivity or neutrality, but it does 
provide us with a more specific set of possibilities that can generate immediate action. 
It is in the spirit of this proposal that I would encourage members of the judiciary to 
pursue education programmes: to lower your sights from the false deities of impartiality 
and objectivity to the manageable chore of getting some useful information that will help to 
make more equitable decisions. As Mr Justice laccobucci recently stated: we need 
"education in a balanced mix of substantive law, skills training and social context 
education".34 My sense is that the conference organizers have struggled hard to provide 
you with such a smorgasbord. These tentative comments might be conceptualized as an 
appetizer for the substantive offerings that are to follow. 
34 As quoted in Friedland, supra, note 6 at 167. 
